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The entangled graph states [9] have emerged as an elegant and powerful quantum resource, indeed
almost all multiparty protocols can be written in terms of graph states including measurement based
quantum computation (MBQC), error correction and secret sharing amongst others. In addition they
are at the forefront in terms of implementations. As such they represent an excellent opportunity
to move towards integrated protocols involving many of these elements. In this paper we look at
expressing and extending graph state secret sharing [3] and MBQC in a common framework and
graphical language related to flow [5, 4]. We do so with two main contributions.
First we express in entirely graphical terms which set of players can access which information in
graph state secret sharing protocols. These succinct graphical descriptions of access allow us to take
known results from graph theory to make statements on the generalisation of the previous schemes
to present new secret sharing protocols.
Second, we give a set of necessary conditions as to when a graph with flow, i.e. capable of
performing a class of unitary operations, can be extended to include vertices which can be ignored,
pointless measurements, and hence considered as unauthorised players in terms of secret sharing, or
error qubits in terms of fault tolerance. This offers a way to extend existing MBQC patterns to secret
sharing protocols. Our characterisation of pointless measurements is believed also to be a useful tool
for further integrated measurement based schemes, for example in constructing fault tolerant MBQC
schemes.
1 Introduction
The one-way model is a universal model of quantum computation introduced by Briegel and Russendorf
[1] that consists of performing a sequence of one-qubit measurements on an initial entangled quantum
state. A detailed description of the model is captured in the measurement calculus [2]. A pattern P =
(V, I,O,A), is defined over a set of qubits V , where I/O is the subset representing input/output qubits,
and A is the measurement calculus commands, listed below. The semantics of a pattern [[P]] : hI → hO
is defined as follows.
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[[(V, I,O,A)]] := ρ 7→ ∑
s∈{0,1}Oc
[[A]]sρ[[A]]†s
[[A′A]]s := [[A′]]s ◦ [[A]]s
[[Ei, j]]s := ρ 7→ ∧Zi, jρ∧Zi, j
[[Mαi ]]s := ρ 7→
{
〈+α |iρ|+α〉i if si = 0
〈−α |iρ|−α〉i if si = 1
[[X s ji ]]s := ρ 7→
{
ρ if s j = 0
XiρXi if s j = 1
[[Zs ji ]]s := ρ 7→
{
ρ if s j = 0
ZiρZi if s j = 1
The main focus of this paper is the structural characterisation of secret sharing protocols within the
framework of measurement-based quantum computing. In doing so we will use the the notation of flow
that is a very useful tool to chracterize the feasibility of a measurement-based computation using a graph
state [4, 5] that can be computed in polynomial time [8].
Definition 1 (g,≺) is a gflow of (G, I,O), where g : V (G) \O→℘(V (G) \ I) and ≺ is a strict partial
order over V (G), if and only if
1. if j ∈ g(i) then i≺ j
2. if j ∈ Odd(g(i)) then j = i or i≺ j
3. i ∈ Odd(g(i))
Where Odd(K) = {u , |N(u)∩K| = 1 mod 2} is the odd neighbourhood of K, i.e. the set of vertices
which have an odd number of neighbours in K.
A detailed introduction on secret sharing protocols can be found in [3]. Here we present the notations
and definitions that are required in this paper. Informally speaking an (n,k) secret sharing protocol is a
multi-partite protocol with a special party called dealer, who holds a secret S, which is either a bit or a
qubit, and must send this secret to n players such that any k or more players can reconstruct the secret,
and all sets of fewer than k players as well as eavesdroppers are denied any access whatsoever to the
secret.
Following [3], this can then be broken down into three separate settings. First, sharing of a classical
secret, where there is already a secure channel between the dealer and the players, denoted CC. Second,
sharing of a classical secret, where there is possible eavesdropping between the dealer and the players
and we use quantum channels to over come this, denoted CQ. Third sharing of a quantum secret over
quantum channels between the dealer and players, denoted QQ. Although the CC graph state scheme
gives no advantage over existing classical schemes, they are very useful to consider as they offer insight
into the CQ and QQ cases where there is a quantum advantage (indeed QQ is by definition a quantum
problem).
One can formalise a CC classical secret sharing protocol over a graph state G as follows. Let A ⊆
V (G), a classical secret sharing protocol (G,A) is:
• A dealer holds a secret s ∈ {0,1} and prepares the state
|φ(s)〉= ZsA|G〉
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where |G〉=∏(u,v)∈E(G)∧Zu,v
⊗
u∈V (G) (|0〉u+ |1〉u)/
√
2
• The dealer sends each qubit of |φ(s)〉 to a distinct player.
Definition 2 Given a protocol (G,A) and a set S ⊆V (G) of players, the reduced density matrix associ-
ated with these players is:
ρS(s) := trV\S(|φ(s)〉〈φ(s)|)
Definition 3 (Privacy) A secret is private from a set of players if they cannot obtain any information
about the secret. For CC secret sharing the secret this corresponds to a set S⊆V (G) such that
ρS(0) = ρS(1).
Definition 4 (Accessibility) A secret accessible to a set S if they can reconstruct the secret perfectly. For
CC this corresponds to a set S⊆V (G) such that
tr(ρS(0)ρS(1)) = 0.
Definition 5 (Protocol) A secret sharing protocol (G,A) is k-private, if all sets of fewer than k players
cannot obtain any information about the secret. A secret sharing protocol (G,A) is k-accessible, if any k
or more players can reconstruct the secret.
A protocol (G,A) with n = |V (G)| is a (k,n)- secret sharing protocol if the protocol is both k-private and
k-accessible.
The extensions to CQ and full QQ quantum secret sharing protocols of [3] are obtained by using the
above graph G and attaching an ancilla qubit to the encoding set A which is kept by the dealer. In the
dealer versus players partition this can be viewed as a maximally entangled bipartite state, which is used
as a quantum channel to establish a secret random key between the dealer and authorised players for CQ
(a kind of extension of entanglement based key distribution [10]), or to teleport the secret from the dealer
to authorised players for QQ. The fact that the players are separate means they are restricted in how they
can carry out their half of the protocol to access the secret. The access of information in theses cases is
not just governed by the graph G, but also the conjugate graph, defined below (see [3] for more details).
Definition 6 The conjugate graph G′ with respect to graph G and encoding qubits in A is defined as the
graph given by taking the complementation of graph G over set A.
2 Characterisation
We present a complete and simple graphical condition as to which sets of players can access the secret.
In what follows we define the encoding qubits, A, to be the set of qubits in G where the dealer will act
upon them to encode the initial secret.
Theorem 1 For the CC classical secret sharing protocols (G,A) of [3], the secret can be accessed by a
set S if there exists D⊆ S such that
D∪Odd(D)⊆ S
|D∩A|= 1 mod 2,
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Proof. The proof consists in introducing an observable PS acting on the qubits of S such that the quantum
state sent by the dealer is commuting with PS if the secret is 0 and anticommuting otherwise. Thus the
players in S can reveal the secret by measuring their qubits according to PS.
Let PS :=∏u∈D Xu
(
∏v∈NG(u)Zv
)
. Since D∪OddG(D)⊆ S, PS acts on S. Moreover, PS|G〉= |G〉 since
Xu
(
∏v∈NG(u)Zv
) |G〉 = |G〉 for any u ∈ V (G). Finally, PSZA|G〉 = (−1)|D∩A|ZAPS|G〉 = −ZA|G〉 since X
and Z anticommute and |D∩A|= 1[2]. Thus, PSZsA|G〉= (−1)sZsA|G〉. 2
We define Acc as the minimal accessing sets, that is S ∈ Acc if S can access the information and
∀v ∈ S,S \ {v} cannot access the information. Any set that contains an element of Acc can access the
information. Similarly we define Blk as the minimal blocking sets S ∈ Blk if V \ S cannot access the
information and ∀v ∈ S,V \ (S\{v}) can access the information. Any set that contains an element of Blk
can block the information.
Lemma 7 Acc and Blk are transversal sets.
Proof. By definition, each contains the minimal elements that has a non-empty intersection with each
member of the other. Indeed if S can access the information then no set in V \ S can block it and vice
versa. 2
We finish with another characterisation result for secret sharing.
Theorem 2 For the CC classical secret sharing protocols of [3] on graph G, the secret cannot be ac-
cessed by a set S if there exists K ∈V (G)\S such that
Odd(K)∩S = A∩S
where A denotes the encoding qubits.
Proof. If the condition is satisfied, then the players in V \ S can act on the state such that the reduced
state of the players in S does not depend on the secret. Indeed, let P :=∏u∈K Xu
(
∏v∈NG(u)\S Zv
)
. By defi-
nition, P is acting on V \S. Moreover |G〉 is a fixpoint of PZA∩S, so ZA|G〉= ZA\SP|G〉. Thus the reduced
density matrix of the players in S does not depend on the secret s∈ {0,1}: ρS(1) = trV\S(ZA|G〉〈G|ZA) =
trV\S(ZA\SP|G〉〈G|P†ZA\S) = trV\B(|G〉〈G|) = ρB(0). 2
The conditions for access in the CQ and QQ cases are the same, but should be satisfied by both G
and the conjugate graph G′ defined in the last section [3]. That is, sets that can access for both G and G′
(for the same encoding set A), where access is determined by Theorems 1 and 2, can access the secret
when extended to CQ and QQ. Further, sets that cannot access information in the CC case for G cannot
access the secret for the extension to CQ and QQ.
Clearly from the proofs, one can verify that Theorem 1 implies Theorem 2. In fact it can also
be shown that implication holds the otherway around also [11]. Thus, either the classical information
can be accessed locally, by stabilisers, in accordance with Theorem 1 or it cannot be accessed at all,
and the condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied. Since these Theorems also govern the manipulation of
quanutm information via the conjugate graph, the implications are also important for error correction
and likely can be extended to other means of pushing around quantum information. This is potentially
very powerful tool to try and prove many statements about information access and manipulation in graph
sates, and will be presented in other work [11]. Here we will concentrate on the relevance to secret
sharing.
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3 New Protocols and other implications
Despite the simple condition of theorems 1 and 2, it is still an open question which graphs will satisfy
them. However these theorems allow us to take known results from graph theory to make statements on
the generalisation of the secret sharing schemes presented in [3] as we describe here.
We consider different cases for the graph G = (V,E), where the access set can be obtained based on
the results of the previous section. In theses examples all the qubits are encoding qubits, A =V .
The first case we consider is the complete bipartite graphs. We split the partners in two parties
depending on the side of the bipartition they are in, and we prove that to access the information the
unanimity from one side of the partition and at least a partner from the second side are required.
Theorem 3 If G is a complete bipartite graph G= Kn,n with n≥ 2. Then the accessing set for CC secret
sharing is defined as follows.
Acc(G) = {{u,v1 . . . ,vn} ∈V,(u,vi) ∈ E}
Proof. An accessing set is of the form D∪Odd(D) with |D| odd. Thus D contains an odd number of
vertices in one side of the partition which implies that the other side is in Odd(D). Minimal sets of that
form contains only one vertex in one side of the partition. 2
The second case is when G is obtained from the complete bipartite graph by removing a perfect
matching M (Figure 1). A perfect matching is a set of edges that intersects each vertex once. We split the
participants in two parties depending on the side of the bipartition they are in, and we add a priveleged
partner in the other side to each participant, we prove that the accessing party has to have a vertex from
each pair of the matching : at least one person from each pair has to agree. Note that the minimal
accessing sets are of size 2n+1.
Figure 1: Secret sharing with a bipartite graph minus a matching
Theorem 4 If G is obtained from the complete bipartite graph Kn,n by removing a matching M =
{(ui,vi)}i∈[1,n], G = Kn,n \M, n≥ 1. Then the accessing set for CC secret sharing is defined as follows.
Acc(G) = {{ui1 . . .uil}∪{v j1 . . .v jk},k+ l = n,{i1 . . . il}∪{ j1 . . . jk}= [1,n]}
Proof. An accessing set is of the form D∪Odd(D) with |D| odd. Thus D contains an odd number of
vertices in one side of the partition. Suppose that D∪Odd(D) does not contain neither ui nor vi with
(ui,vi) an edge from the matching, then D contains an even number of vertices in both sides of the
partition as ui and vi are not in Odd(D). Furthermore, if a set contains exactly one vertex from each pair
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of the matching, it contains an odd number of vertices and thus it contains an odd number of vertices
in one side of the bipartition the odd neighborhood of this part is exactly the set of vertices that are not
linked to these vertices in the matching so it is of the form D∪Odd(D) with |D| odd. 2
In both these cases the conjugate graphs G′ have different access structures, so unfortunately they
cannot be extended to CQ and QQ secret sharing. However this does not apply to the next example.
The final case is when G is a 3× 3 torus (cartesian product of two triangles K3K3, Figure 2). We
associate to each participant a line and a column and we prove that the accessing party has either one
line and one column or one representative from each line and column. Note that in this case, the property
that minimal accessing sets are of same cardinality is relaxed.
Figure 2: Secret sharing using a torus.
Lemma 8 If G = K3K3, then the accessing set for CC secret sharing is the union of the diagonals and
neighborhoods Acc(G) = Dg∪Ng where
Dg = {{ui1, j1 ,ui2, j2 ,ui3, j3}, ik 6= il & jk 6= jl}
Ng = {{ui1, j1 ,ui1, j2 ,ui1, j3 ,ui2, j1 ,ui3, j1}, ik 6= il & jk 6= jl}
Proof. We make use of the fact that the graph is vertex transitive to simplify the case analysis. The sets
S = D∪Odd(D) for |D|= 1 are the neighborhoods Ng. If |D|= 3 if D has no edge then it is a diagonal
Dg and Odd(D) = D, if D has one edge then S contains a neighborhood, if D has two or three edges
then S contains a diagonal.If |D|= 5 then if D contains 3 vertices in a column and one vertex in the two
others then it also contains a diagonal, if D contains 3 vertices in a column and 2 in an other column then
S = D∪Odd(D) contains a neighborhood. If D contains 2 vertices in two first columns and 1 in the last
column then if the vertices in the first two columns are in the same lines then S contains a neighborhood,
otherwise D contains a diagonal. If |D|= 7 then D contains a diagonal. 2
The conjugate graph G′ is exactly the same form, but with vertices shuffled about - the diagonals of
the original are now the rows and columns and vice versa. Explicitly the vertices u′i, j of G
′ are given by
u′1,1 = u1,1, u
′
1,2 = u2,2, u
′
1,3 = u3,3, u
′
2,1 = u3,2, u
′
2,2 = u1,3, u
′
2,3 = u2,1, u
′
3,1 = u2,3, u
′
3,2 = u3,1, u
′
3,3 = u1,2.
We can clearly see here that all the neighborhoods can access in both G and G′, since the diagonals
are not neighbours in one graph and so are clearly in the same neighborhood in the other graph. The
same goes for neighborhoods.
Lemma 9 If G = K3K3, then for CQ and QQ secret sharing, all neighborhoods Ng can access the
secret.
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Proof. The proof follows from the construction of the conjugate graph and application of Lemma 8 to
the conjugate graph. 2
As well as these explicit examples, we can also make some more general statements about the impli-
cations of Theorems 1 and 2, which will help us see how far we can push these ideas. For example, it is
known that the (2,3)-secret sharing protocol is impossible using these graph state schemes as noted in
[3]. In this direction, we can easily see the following two lemmas.
Lemma 10 For a CC (k,n)-secret sharing scheme (G,A), we must have
|A| ≥ n− k+1.
Proof. By Theorem 2 set S =V (G)/A cannot access the secret (indeed this is obvious since the reduced
density matrix is independent of the secret). For the protocol to be k-accessible we thus demand that
k−1≥ |S|= |V (G)/A|= n−A giving the lemma. 2
Lemma 11 For a CC (k,n)-secret sharing scheme (G,A), we must have that the degree deg(a) satisfies
deg(a)≥ k−1
∀a ∈ A.
Proof. By Theorem 1, a+N(a) can access the secret ∀a ∈ A. For the protocol to be k-private we thus
demand that deg(a)≥ k−1 ∀a ∈ A. 2
Further application of these can get quite detailed, but we are able to make some general statements,
for example the following lemma.
Lemma 12 For odd n, it is impossible to use graph state secret sharing [3] to do a CC (n−1,n)-secret
sharing protocol (G,A) with A =V (G).
Proof. To be an (n−1,n) threshold scheme any set S, |S|= n−1 must be able to access the secret. From
Theorem 2 we then have N(a) 6= A∩V/a ∀a ∈ A, which in turn implies that deg(a) 6= | ∩V/a| ∀a ∈ A.
When A =V this reduces to deg(a)≤ n−2 ∀a ∈V . Along with Lemma 11 we have that deg(a) = n−2
∀a ∈V , which is impossible to satisfy for n is odd.
4 Flow of Secret Sharing
Generally speaking, one can view a QQ quantum secret sharing as a one-way pattern where the dealer
possess the input qubit, the output is one of the qubit in the access set, and all the qubits of unauthorised
parties (who cannot access the secret) can be viewed as pointless measurements, i.e. measurements that
have no effect on the deterministic computation from input to output. Recall that we can characterise a
deterministic computation from input to output in a given graph using flow or generalised flow [4, 5]. In
this section we present a set of simple rules that graphically characterises a pointless measurement with
respect to a given flow construction. This will be the basis of our scheme for extending a given one-way
pattern into a secret sharing protocol.
For a given patternP = (V, I,O,A) and an auxiliary qubit u∈V \(I∪O), we defineP|u to be a new
pattern where the measurement of u is removed, i.e. u is no longer measured and it becomes an output
qubit, and hence the signal su is set to 0.
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Definition 13 For a given patternP = (V, I,O,A′Mαu A), let
P|u := (V, I,O∪{u},(A′[su← 0])A)
Let F be a completely positive trace preserving map acting on a space including qubit u, then the
tracing out operator tru(F), is defined as
ρ 7→ tru(F(ρ)) := ρ 7→ ∑x∈{0,1}〈x|uF(ρ)|x〉u
Definition 14 We define the measurement of qubit u in patternP to be pointless if [[P]] = tru([[P|u]]),
where tru(.) is the trace out of the qubit u.
The trace command, tru, can be easily encoded in the measurement calculus, i.e. for any pattern
P = (V, I,O,A), there existsP ′ = (V, I,O\{u},A′) s.t.
tru([[P]]) = [[P ′]]
Lemma 15 For any patternP = (V, I,O,A) and any u ∈ Ic, if
P ⇒∗ (V, I,O,ACAMAE)
then
tru([[P]]) = [[P ′]]
whereP ′ = (V, I,O\{u},ACAM(∏v∈N(u)Zsuv )MZu AE).
In the following theorem, we prove that the accessibility in a secret sharing protocol with graph states
is related to the existence of a patternP where all the qubits in V \S are pointless.
Theorem 5 For a given CC secret sharing protocol G, with secret encoded in A and a given k≥ 0, if for
any S⊆V (G) s.t. |S|= k there exists a patternP s.t.
• The underlying graph of G (P) is G augmented with an input vertex a connected to all the vertices
of A, and where the output vertex is any vertex of S.
• [[P]] is unitary ;
• V \S is pointless inP
then the protocol is a (|V (G)|,k)- QQ quantum secret sharing protocol.
Proof. Any set of k partners S can apply the pattern given by the theorem to compute [[P]] indepen-
dently of the action of the others. Thus any k partners can access the information, just by applying [[P]]†
on the output qubit. Any fewer than k partners cannot since it is already a CC secret sharing protocol,
and if they cannot access the classical information, their reduced states are independent of the quantum
information also, hence it is inaccessible. 2
Although it seems a hard task to characterise which qubits might become pointless the following
result gives us a way to handle some special cases. More precisely we present a necessary and sufficient
condition for a qubit being pointless with respect to a given flow construction and assuming that all
vertices are measured in the (X ,Y ) plane. The intuition behind the theorem is to find a set of conditions
that makes the Z and X errors induced by tracing out the pointless measurement, ineffective. In order to
analyse the Z error propagation we will use the notion of influencing walks for geometries [6].
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Definition 16 Let ( f ,) be the flow of a geometry (G, I,O). An influencing walk at node v is an I− v
walk in G that starts with a flow edge, has no two consecutive non-flow edges and traverses flow edges
in the forward direction.
And to analyse the effect of an X error we will use the phase map decomposition for unitaries [7]
which leads to a simple characterisation of patterns implementing the same unitary. Assuming that
|V |= m and |I|= |O|= n, we define the index set Apq for p,q ∈ {0,1}n as follows
Apq = (p+ k(2n−1), p+(k+1)(2n−1), · · · , p+ k′(2n−1))
where k is the smallest integer such that
p+ k(2n−1)≥ (q−1)2m−n+1
and k′ is the largest integer such that
p+ k′(2n−1)≤ q2m−n
Theorem 6 LetP be a pattern on graph G(V, I,O) with angles of measurement {αi}i∈OC and let p be
a qubit in V such that the graph G\ p has flow. The measurement at qubit p is pointless if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied
(a) ∃S⊂V \O, S 6= /0, such that Odd(S)⊆ NG(u).
(b) For all p,q ∈ {0,1}|I| we have
∑x∈Apq e
−i∑Oc α jx j = ∑x∈Apq e
−i∑Oc α ′jx j
where
α ′j =
{ −α j j ∈ S
α j otherwise
Proof. First, we discuss the forward direction, i.e. we assume p ∈V is a pointless measurement and we
show how the above conditions are satisfied. We know from Lemma 15 that tracing out p introduces
Z errors on all qubits in N(p) however these errors do not change the underlying computation of the
pattern. Recall that a Z error on a qubit will flip the result of measurement on that qubit (Fi)
Mαi Zi = M
α+pi
i = F
1
i M
α
i
Therefore the Z errors resulting from the trace out operator, will propagate through pattern and will have
an effect on the final output. To analyse their effect we note that Z errors can only propagate through
an influencing walk over G \ p which has a unique flow. This is due to the fact that any two dependent
commands lay on a same influencing walk [6]. Furthermore the structure of flow dependencies along a
walk are in such a way that a Z error will propagate over even distanced qubits and hence introduces new
Z errors at these even distanced qubits, Figure 3 part a and b. However a Z error will not propagate on a
walk with a non-flow edge starting at even distance of the Z error, Figure 3 part c. Finally qubit at odd
distance from a Z error that has been propagated will receive an X error, Figure 3 part d.
On the other hand since p is pointless, on any output qubits the above induced errors must cancel
out. Therefore a Z error at qubit x ∈ N(p) (induced due to tracing out p) on a walk starting at x ending at
output o (that introduce either X or Z error on o) has to be cancel out by
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Figure 3: Propagation of Z errors
(i) either hitting another yx ∈ N(p) at an even distance on the same walk
(ii) or there exists another unique walk also ending at o with yx ∈ N(p) such that x and yx are even
distanced over the walk x− c− yx, where c is the first common qubit on both walks.
We can now construct a set S such that Odd(S) ⊆ NG(u). Let for any x ∈ N(p), Sx to be the set of
qubits between x and yx over the common walk for the case (i) and over the walk x− c− yx for the case
(ii), and at odd distances from x and define
S = ∪x∈N(p)Sx
In order to show
Odd(S)⊂ N(p)
we prove for any l 6∈ N(p) and any of its neighbour s ∈ S there exists another of its neighbour s′ ∈ S,
which implies l 6∈ Odd(S). Due to flow construction, there must exists an x ∈ N(p) such that s ∈ Sx and
the incoming edge into s in Sx is a flow edge. Hence x is at even distance from l and the Z error at x can
propagate along x− l. Therefore there exists a yx at even distance from l along the walk starting with
x− l, which implies the neighbour of l along x− yx belongs to S.
So far we have ignored the X error that has been produced due to the propagation of the Z error from
x into yx, that is the X errors over the set S. However unlike a Z error, an X error cannot be propagated
and will have a direct effect on the measurement of underlying qubit
Mαi Xi = M
−α
i
Let {α ′i} to be as defined in the theorem, since p is a pointless measurement, the two patterns over G\ p
with angles {αi} and {α ′i} should implement the same unitary which from phase map decomposition
leads to the statement of condition b in the theorem.
The proof in other direction is straightforward, since due to the above discussion the existence of a
set S will permit one to discharge the effect of all induced Z errors obtained from tracing out qubit p
which concludes p has a pointless measurement. 2
One simple scenario for condition (b) is when all qubits in S are measured with Pauli X . One
can easily extend the above theorem to characterise a set of vertices that are simultaneously pointless
with respect to a given pattern with flow. However a further adjustment is required to extend the same
approach to the domain of generalised flow [5].
The first step in using the above theorem is to start with a fixed graph with input and output with flow,
then by adding appropriate measurements and edges we extend the graph to one with maximum number
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of pointless measurements. However via this method one might not obtain a symmetric protocol, that is
a pattern where we can choose which qubits to become pointless after choosing the output qubits. We
leave as an open question how one could use the above result for building a true secret sharing protocol.
5 Conclusions
In this work we have considered graph state secret sharing protocols of [3], their complete graphical
description and formal connection to other one-way quantum information protocols.
We have given graphical rules on which sets of players can access the secret, and which cannot.
These rules were then used to generate and prove the validity of new protocols, as well as make some
general statements and no-goes for graph state protocols. Their full extent and use for further protocols
and no goes remains open.
We have also given necessary and sufficient conditions for the addition of vertices corresponding to
pointless measurements (i.e. measurements which do not effect the outcome of a computation) in a one
way pattern with flow. In the context of secret sharing this offers a path to generate new quantum secret
sharing protocols directly. This result also has interest in the context of fault tolerance where it can be
viewed as offering a path to allow for faulty qubits.
Both of these sets of contributions put secret sharing closer to the general framework of measurement
based quantum information processing and, as such, open up the possibility to incorporate it into larger
network tasks involving several different elements such as computation, error correction and secret shar-
ing. In the other direction, the techniques and results developed may prove useful beyond secret sharing
in particular for the development fault tolerant MBQC.
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